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PANEL DISCUSSION
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: REFLECTIONS
ON THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS AND
ASPIRATIONS FOR THE FUTURE*
Welcome. My name is Leah Wortham. I coordinate the ten clinical pro-
grams here at Catholic University Law School. This weekend we are cele-
brating the Fifteenth Anniversary of one of those programs, Columbus
Community Legal Services. The celebration will be marked by a reunion of
Clinic alumni and a symposium on clinical legal education. This panel kicks
off both of those events.
Columbus Community Legal Services was one of the first programs estab-
lished by a law school to offer law students credit for a clinical experience.
Its fifteenth birthday offers some unique opportunities. With assistance from
Dr. David Baker of the University's Sociology Department, the Anniversary
Committee of Clinic faculty and alumni have designed a survey of those who
have taken the clinic. That survey attempts to test some hypotheses about
clinical education including why students take the courses, what they gain
from them, effect on career plans, and whether answers of students from one
era will differ from those of another. The results should be of interest to
clinical education, and law schools, generally.
This panel also offers another opportunity for legal education. To cele-
brate the Clinic's fifteenth anniversary, we have assembled an extraordina-
rily distinguished group of clinical teachers to reflect on developments in the
past fifteen years of clinical legal education and to comment on the greatest
needs for the next fifteen years.
Our panelists represent at least sixty years of experience in clinical teach-
ing and include three former Chairs of the Association of American Law
Schools' Section on Clinical Legal Education. As I introduce them individu-
ally, you will see that each panelist brings a wealth of background to the
panel. Let me first introduce each in the order of their presentations. After
opening remarks by the panelists, they will respond to each other, and then
we will open the floor to questions and comments.
* Panel discussion delivered at the Catholic University Law School Conference on
Clinical Education, October 18, 1986.
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The first speaker will be Kandis Scott. Kandis is the Director of the Santa
Clara University Legal Clinic. She is one of the former Chairs of the Ameri-
can Association of Law Schools Clinical Section on this panel.
Our next speaker will be Dean Hill Rivkin, another of the Chairs of the
Clinical Section. He has been a professor at the University of Tennessee
Law School for ten years. He was a teaching fellow at Harvard Law School
in 1975-76 and a visiting professor at U.C.L.A. in 1980. He has been very
active in the Association of American Law Schools beyond the clinical sec-
tion, as well as the American Bar Association, having served as a member of
the Association of American Law Schools' Professional Development Com-
mittee and the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar.
Philip G. Schrag is a Professor at Georgetown University Law Center and
Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies. He has been at Ge-
orgetown for six years. Phil was a professor at Columbia Law School in
New York from 1971-79. Phil is one of the most prolific writers in the
clinical legal education movement, having written five books and several ar-
ticles on clinical education and public interest law.
Roger Wolf is one of the historians of Columbus Community Legal Serv-
ices, with whom we were debating the Clinic's exact age earlier. He has been
at the University of Maryland Law School for five years and currently is a
Law School Associate Professor. - He directs the Attorney General's Con-
sumer Protection Clinic. From 1971 to 1978, he was at Catholic University
Law School as a pioneer at Columbus Community Legal Services.
Finally, we have Elliott Milstein, who is a Professor of Law at American
University, and Director of Clinical Programs there. He has been at Ameri-
can University for fourteen years, following one year at the University of
Connecticut Law School and practice with New Haven Legal Assistance As-
sociation. He is another one of our past Chairs of the AALS Clinical Section
and is a member of the AALS Accreditation Committee.
KANDIS SCOTT:
I want to thank the people at Catholic for the honor of inviting me to
celebrate with them Columbus Community Legal Services' years in clinical
education. Let me describe one narrow development in clinical education in
the last fifteen years: the changing place of clinical courses in the law school
curriculum.
Clinical courses originated on the fringe of the law school not its core.
Some programs began with students volunteering at legal aid offices. At
other schools, students pressed the faculty to offer "boutique" courses. The
faculty expected student interest to fade and then to remove these courses
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from the curriculum. Another important impetus for clinical courses was
"free money" from the Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibility.
Despite its origins around the edges of the legal education establishment,
clinical education has become a legitimate part of the curriculum. Some
criticism of clinical courses remains, especially criticism focused on cost be-
cause our student/faculty ratio is substantially smaller and, therefore, more
expensive than traditional courses. But I venture to say that almost every
law teacher in the country now assumes that some clinical courses belong in
the permanent curriculum. That is quite a change from fifteen years ago.
Another measure of the increased legitimacy of clinical courses is their
influence on the traditional curriculum. That influence has been strongest in
the areas of teaching methods and skills training. For instance, there are
many teachers of traditional law school courses who are no longer comforta-
ble using what they call the Socratic method, a technique which often
degenerates into a lecture mode. These educators are introducing small
changes to make their courses livelier and more relevant. The modifications
may be as simple as converting to the problem method, using video tapes,
demonstrating a courtroom procedure or distributing a sample document, or
perhaps even taking an interdisciplinary approach. Such innovations were
stimulated by the presence of clinical teachers using interesting and exciting
teaching methods in the law school.
A second change is that teachers of some traditional courses are assigning
students new tasks. For example, some teachers now ask their students to
draft wills in estates courses and mortgages in real estate transaction courses.
Legal research and writing teachers provide the information for writing ex-
ercises by showing a video tape of a lawyer interviewing a client. And so,
clinical education has had an important effect on the traditional curriculum.
This legitimation of clinical education has not been without cost. As we
clinicians have become part of the law school establishment, we have become
more established. I see some loss in our effectiveness as a force for further
change in the law school in the future. We may have become a little less the
gadfly around the law school.
Leaving these observations I would like to offer my wish for the future. I
wish that clinicians would move away from the areas in which they have
been most successful and have had the most influence: development of novel
teaching methods and training students in lawyering skills. I suggest that
clinicians focus more on touching students profoundly, something that tradi-
tional courses cannot do. In clinical courses, students do more than acquire
factual information or the ability to think analytically. Clinical courses force
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students to confront the same dilemma as that of a lawyer whose zealous
representation may permit an alcoholic to continue to drive. Students must
face sexism or racism in the justice system which they are unable to change
immediately. Good clinical teachers use their students' personal, even emo-
tional, reactions to such problems of practice to encourage them to reflect on
how they will be as professionals, not just how they will act. Traditional
courses cannot do this. I wish that in the future clinicians would emphasize
helping students make the transition from an academic life to their new roles
as sensitive, thoughtful, professionals participating in the justice system.
DEAN HILL RIVKIN:
My remarks focus on the reform mission of clinical education, what I view
as the "meta-ethics" of this field. Since its inception, clinical legal education
has embodied a variety of visions of professional reform.' In these often
inchoate visions, clinical educators aspired to effect sweeping reform of legal
education, and more ambitiously, the legal profession. Claims of legal edu-
cation's potential as an insurgent movement for change infused much of the
early rhetoric about the clinic.2
Today those claims are locked up in the closet, surfacing infrequently in
scholarship and in public settings. What has transformed clinical education
over the past fifteen to twenty years into a relatively safe academic special-
ity? In these remarks, I hope to shed some light on this troublesome
evolution.
In its early years, clinical education lay claim to a long standing tradition
of reform from within legal education. Clinical educators drew inspiration
from Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and other legal realists who, taking
insights from other disciplines, diffused many traditional notions about law
and, in turn, legal education.
The clinical movement also learned much from the legal process thinkers
of the 1950's and 60's, lead by the Hart and Sacks' Legal Process materials.3
In a limited way, the legal process thinkers struggled to transcend the pre-
vailing formalism of the time.4 I do not think it is any coincidence that
1. See Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274 (1986); Simon,
Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Pincus, A Small Proposal for a Big Change in Legal Education, 1970 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 913.
3. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tent. ed. 1958).
4. In recent years, the Legal Process materials have been criticized for promoting an
unacknowledged pluralist political vision of the legal process, a vision that staunchly maintains
the status quo. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS (1981) (promoting a
critical view of the legal profession by encouraging lawyers to question the choices available to
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Bellow and Moulton's clinical text, The Lawyering Process, has that title.5
In some sense, the book follows in the Hart and Sacks' tradition by examin-
ing the "interstices" of the lawyering process.
It was the societal legacy of the sixties, however, that most shaped clinical
education. The fervor of the sixties penetrated law schools quite passion-
ately. To overstate, law schools were criticized as detached, dehumanizing
institutions educating one dimensional technicians divorced from the hurly-
burly of the real world. The clinical movement at the time predicted that
law students trained in this manner would inexorably become bad lawyers-
professionals characterized by insensitive personal relationships and crabbed
aspirations about the law's potential for good. The clinical movement, on
the other hand, offered itself as a revolutionary alternative.
In these early days of clinical legal education, the days of Watergate, and
the days of Viet Nam, advocates of clinical education genuinely believed that
reform of legal education would lead to reform of the profession. The
clinical movement saw itself as the antithesis of years of entrenched ideas
about pedagogy and change in legal education. Clinicians claimed to be sen-
sitive, egalitarian, nonhierarchical, mutual trusting, caring, open, etc.-offer-
ing a sharply contrasting professioned model to their nonclinical colleagues.6
As the movement rapidly matured, the intellectual roots of the emerging
discipline also began to sprout. There was a humanistic strand drawing,
among others, on Carl Rogers' well-known methods. This emphasis on in-
terpersonal relations was in part responsible for the notion that clinical edu-
cation was soft7 or lacking substance in the traditional sense. There also was
an ethics strand in the early days that sought to translate exposure to real life
ethical dilemmas into moral growth.8 Finally, there was a political strand
that was closely aligned with the then growing legal services and public in-
terest law movements. 9
Each of the so-called schools developed formative ideas about the need to
reform both public, and in a limited sense, private lawyering. During these
them and their clients at every stage of the relationship). The politics of the Lawyering Process
book are worthy of much further development.
5. G. Bellow & B. Moulton, supra note 4.
6. See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV.
487 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Barkai, A New Model for Legal Communication: Sensory Experience and
Representational Systems, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads. The Need for Direction,
1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1025; Pincus, One Man's Perspective on Ethics and the Legal Profession,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279 (1975).
9. See Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NAT'L
LEGAL AID DEFENDERS Assoc. A. BRIEFCASE l-D6 (1977).
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fleeting years, there was hope that the rhetoric of reform in clinical educa-
tion actually might have some substance. Lamentably, academic movements
with potential for change have a way of becoming coopted. What was once
the fringe, or, as one of the Presidents of the Association of American Law
Schools called it-"the side show"-now has become the main stream.
The reasons for this transformation are complex. In many ways, the gen-
trification of clinical legal education has matched the changes that overtook
other forces of change that were spawned in the sixties-the civil rights
movement, the environmental movement, the consumer movement. In all, a
number of the core impulses of these movements have been overtaken by this
country's powerful ability to assimilate, through conflict, movements of
political and social reform.
For clinical education, the confrontation with the legal education estab-
lishment has taken its toll. Clinical education in recent years has literally
become "clinical," in all that that word connotes. Slowly, the early norma-
tive emphasis has shifted to congeries of relatively safe, narrow goals. Skill
acquisition became paramount-how to interview, how to bargain, how to
conduct a deposition, etc. Emulating other quantitative trends in legal edu-
cation, clinical education began to concentrate on testing and measuring.10
The performance tests on the California bar epitomize a number of these
developments. "
Today, the clinical education movement is in the throes of a serious iden-
tity crisis. Critical legal studies and the law and society movement have out-
flanked clinical education on the left. Few serious efforts to forge alliances
with these currents are underway. Indeed, clinical education has been ac-
cused by Critical Legal Studies people of legitimizing, in a negative sense,
the law school's social obligations. 2
What does the future hold? I am not sure, but at least I can identify some
possibilities. The work being done at City University of New York Law
School at Queens, is an attempt to fuse the early ethical, humanistic, and
political roots of the movement into a real substantive method-a pedagogy
that is nurturing insight over technique, intuition over method, and imagina-
tion over procedure. 13
10. Although it is treacherous to compare the two, the zeal of the law and economics
movement to "quantify" human behavior resembles the recent clinical focus on "testing"
skills.
11. See Smith, Preparing and Grading the California Performance Test, 53 B. EXAMINER
16 (1984).
12. The argument from the political left is that clinical education provides token outlets
for those students whose social consciousness aligns them with critical legal studies. This al-
lows law schools to tout clinical programs as satisfying the institutional responsibilities.
13. See, e.g., New Aspects of Clinical Programs, 17 SYLLABUS 8 (Dec. 1986).
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A second strong need for the future is to develop an ethnography of lawy-
ering-a specific, contextually based approach to understanding what it is
like to be a lawyer on a day to day basis. We need an approach that goes
beyond the handful of the most sensitive books about lawyering-James
Kunen's book, "How Can You Defend Those People? The Making of a
Criminal Lawyer"14 or Seymour Wishman's book, "Confessions of a Crimi-
nal Lawyer." 5
Some of the novels about law have embodied such an approach. For ex-
ample, James Mills book, "One Just Man," is a powerful story about a pub-
lic defender in New York City.' 6 The defender decides that, because the
criminal system is so systemically corrupt, he is no longer going to plea bar-
gain on behalf of his clients. The moral stand of this one individual leads to
the filling of the jails and, eventually rebellion in the streets of New York.
This is fiction, but it sensitively portrays some of the moral and political
choices that exist on a daily basis in law practice.
As a prominent anthropologist recently put it, "[G]ood ethnography is an
intellectual exorcism in which we are wrenched out of ourself."' 7 For me,
this is what scholarship in clinical legal education requires-an examination
of dynamics such as power, coercion, manipulation, or persuasion in a very
concrete context. Such writing would, for example, examine the "free
spaces" in which some theorists believe lies the political potential of lawyer-
ing today. 8 This is the type of scholarship that we are in a unique position
to generate.
In conclusion, this kind of change, both institutional and personal, is not
going to be easy. It is risky, uncomfortable, and threatening. It is also nec-
essary. More so than ever before, clinical education's capacity for change is
being sorely tested. If the movement remains faithful to its reformist roots,
such change will enlarge our understanding not only of lawyering but also of
social change.
14. J. KUNEN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE": THE MAKING OF A CRIMI-
NAL LAWYER (1983).
15. S. WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1981). Three recent articles
have begun an important dialogue that attempts to link the dynamics of law practice with a
broader social vision. Compare Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984) with Lichterman, Social Movements and Legal Elites: Some
Notes From the Margin on the Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
1035 with Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law, II N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983).
16. J. MILLS, ONE JUST MAN (1974).
17. Shweder, Story Telling Among the Anthropologists, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, (Book
Review), at 39, col. 1.
18. See S. EVANS & H. BOYTE, FREE-SPACES-THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE IN AMERICA (1986).
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PHILIP SCHRAG:
In the fifteen years that I have been teaching clinically, I have seen a dis-
turbing trend. It may be another perspective on the same trend that Dean is
talking about. But where Dean focused on teachers, I am going to focus on
students.
Over the last fifteen years, while law school faculties have been asking
more of their clinicians, students who enroll in clinics have been insisting
that we make fewer demands of them. Clinicians are increasingly caught in
a bind that is very familiar to our more traditional colleagues. Our peer
groups and our own professional standards push us to offer our students
greater subtlety in the analysis of the work that they are doing, more ab-
straction, and an emphasis on helping students to begin a long term process
of professional development. But law students in general, and clinic enroll-
ees are no exception, seem to have increasingly narrow learning goals and
relatively less time and energy available for exploring the by-ways of the
legal system.
In looking at this fifteen year period, let me start with faculty expecta-
tions. As Kandis described, when the clinical movement began in the late
sixties, most faculties lacked a clear understanding of what the goals of this
new educational methodology would be. Student demand for a more par-
ticipatory experience, coinciding with the availability of grants from the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), made
it inevitable that most schools would experiment by applying the medical
school model to at least a small part of their curriculum.
Since few existing faculty members wanted to spend the vastly greater
time that clinical teaching entailed, new faculty members were hired-gener-
ally from the public interest movement, legal services programs, or public
defender's offices. These lawyers began by teaching what they knew best-
trial and pretrial skills such as case planning, motion practice, witness exam-
ination, and introduction of evidence. For the most part, the clinics' clients
were poor people or underrepresented groups. The students were excited by
a more participatory methodology and by the opportunity to make a social
contribution to the law school.
But after a brief honeymoon period, skeptical faculty members demanded
that clinicians offer students something more than they would learn in the
first year of working in a law firm. "Mere skills-training," faculty members
argued, had no place in a university. Clinicians tended to agree. In a
number of different ways, we began to offer our students much more than
instruction and rehearsal of the skills associated with advocacy.
Some clinicians plumbed the student's cases for ethical content. Their
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courses became seminars that delved very deeply into particular dilemmas of
professional responsibility. Some focused on the systems in which the stu-
dents practiced, using the cases as windows into the world of the judiciary,
the bar, or of particular administrative agencies. In these clinics, the stu-
dents learned about aspects of law and society by observing certain institu-
tions closely. Other clinics taught students how to become aware of their
personal values. Their instructors were able to show students how their
work on cases advanced or conflicted with their expressed values. Still
others taught students sophisticated models of creative problem solving,
which the students were able to test in their cases. Some clinics developed
techniques for improving certain skills that many faculty members had
doubted could be taught at all in a law school, such as assertiveness, time
management, and leadership. Some specialized in teaching students to be-
come aware of and to analyze the subtlety of interpersonal relationships in
the practice of law and the group dynamics of work-related meetings. Most
clinics offered some combination of these objectives, as clinicians reacted
against the charge that mere skills training was not an appropriate goal for
an institution of higher education.
Through most of the 1970's, this pattern of evolution worked. Clinicians
stayed intellectually fresh by challenging themselves to define new curricular
objectives and to develop methods for achieving them. Traditionalists real-
ized that clinicians were offering something not available either in other
classes or in law firms. They responded by enhancing the status of the clini-
cians of their schools. Students trusted the teachers' definitions of appropri-
ate learning objectives. Their sense of play enabled them along with their
teachers to reach for new insights about how the legal system worked and
how groups within those systems behaved. By the 1980's, clinics were ac-
cepted at most law schools as permanent, stable features of the landscape.
I agree with Kandis that Clinics likely are here to stay, but I see a disqui-
eting trend in recent years. Just as faculties have stopped challenging clini-
cians for doing too much skills training, students have begun to demand
with increasing urgency, that the clinics drop their intellectual frills, and
concentrate on what the students see as basic skills of the litigation trade,
particularly trial skills.
This development seems related to national economic trends. In fact, I
think the first signs of charge can be traced back to 1973. First, we had a
recession triggered by the oil embargo, then a weak economy, then double
digit inflation along with substantial unemployment, and finally a lawyer
glut. So, for more than ten years, law students increasingly have regarded
the economic world that they were about to enter as one of scarcity, rather
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than one of opportunity and intellectual challenge. And throughout all this
period, tuition at private undergraduate and private law schools has risen
steadily, leaving most students tens of thousands of dollars in debt before
they begin to earn any money.' 9
Under these circumstances, it would not be surprising if law students to-
day demand more rules and less philosophy than they did in the 1960's when
many of today's teachers were themselves in school. Nor is it shocking,
given the very large percentage of clinic students in urban areas who work
fifteen to twenty hours a week at outside jobs, to discover that clinic students
want fewer cases, or that they do not work up their cases as thoroughly as
their predecessors, or that they resent having to read books or do other class-
room work, such as simulation, as part of their clinical courses.
It is not surprising, although it certainly is dismaying, that many students
use clinics not for a different intellectual perspective on legal doctrine or
practice or institutions, and not to participate while in law school in societal
reform, but to take a law school offering that they think will train them more
quickly to be successful practitioners. Indeed, some students have even con-
fided to us that they are taking a clinic, not for any educational reason at all,
but to add a line to their resumes that might make them more interesting to
law firms.
Of course, there are many impressive exceptions to this discouraging
trend. In my own clinic and elsewhere, there are many wonderful students
who have had the personality or luck to escape the rut of feeling that they
are working to survive rather than to learn or to serve. These exceptional
students do not feel that they have drifted into law school, and they can
identify some social values that they want to pursue as professionals. They
have not resigned themselves to unsatisfying but lucrative jobs. They see the
clinic as an educational rather than an economic opportunity. But each year
the number of students who feel in control of their careers and their educa-
tional destinies seems to decrease.
I do not know when this pattern will change again, but I do not expect a
large number of law students to take full advantage of what clinics can offer
until they believe that they can afford to take time, during their law school
years, to slow down and until they can afford to believe that their learning is
personally and not just financially enriching. Neither clinics nor law schools
19. Recent economic trends have affected the attitudes of students at virtually all levels of
education; their effects on law schools are only part of a larger social phenomenon. Shortly
after these remarks were delivered, a survey released by he American Council on Education
showed that "a record 73 percent of [freshmen at 552 colleges] listed 'being very well off
financially' as a top goal," up from 39% in 1970. "More Freshmen Prepare for Business,"
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1987, at A15, col. 1.
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nor universities can solve the problems of careerism and survival psychol-
ogy. Only changes in the economic prospects for lawyers, or in national
attitudes about the purpose of professional education, are likely to help law
students to think about the clinics--or for that matter law schools-as some-
thing more than way stations on the road to personal economic security.
Meanwhile, while we wait for the societal changes that could improve the
quality of study in legal clinics, we instructors must resist the temptation to
respond to students either by condemning them or by simply scaling back
our educational requirements to suit their busier schedules and more limited
goals. After all, we have more opportunity than anyone else on the law
school faculty to inspire these students, if only because we have more contact
with them than anyone else does. The first step in the process is simply to
recognize that, as Professor Anthony Amsterdam noted in a recent edition
of the Newsletter of the Section on Clinical Legal Education of the As-
sociaton of American Law Schools, clinics in the mid-1980's present some
problems that clinicians have not previously had to face. The second step is
to develop solutions that enable us better to accept some-but only some-
of the limits that many students want to impose. We must distinguish be-
tween the limits we accept and those we need to challenge. And when we
choose to challenge, we must do so in ways which do not seem punitive or
arbitrary, but which cause students to feel enriched by expanding their con-
cepts of how they can benefit from clinical study.
ROGER WOLF:
Before the panel, we were trying to figure out how old the Clinic is. I
guess that is a test of how old I am. I remember Dean Clinton Bamberger
forcing me to write an application to the Meyer Foundation so that we could
buy the building that now houses the Clinic, and I remember arguing our
request to the Foundation. Fifteen years ago most of those of us who got
into clinical education came from legal services. The selling point to the
Meyer Foundation, CLEPR, and other good-hearted souls that were giving
money away was that we were serving poor people.
Life was very simple at that point. The big debate was between in-house
or out-house clinics. Those of us who came into clinical teaching from legal
services had reacted to the system and formulated agendas to address what
we thought was wrong. Our criticism of legal education arose from our own
experience, because our legal educations had not prepared us to practice the
kind of law that we encountered in our practice. Clinical teaching in law
schools offered a respite from legal services and an opportunity to train law
students to go back and fight the same battles that we had fought. We had
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not just a skill but a value orientation as well. We wanted to teach more
than just substance in courses.
There was a wonderful merging because the students at that time had the
same agenda. Our agenda may have kept us separate and struggling with
law schools for some kind of credibility, but students and teachers in the
Clinic shared the same goals.
That has changed over fifteen years. I agree with all the previous panelists
that clinical education has become an acceptable part of the law school cur-
riculum. My concern is that the values we tried to teach when we first
started clinical education are very difficult to transmit today.
Because of the economic circumstances, because legal services is not a
ready employment source, because public interest law firms are few and hard
to get into, it becomes much more difficult for students to find jobs that mesh
the values of the early days with post law school employment. Students
coming to law school and trying to find jobs have to direct themselves other-
wise, and they are going toward traditional law firms. As a result, they are
coming to the clinics looking for skills only. I am afraid we have begun to
accommodate that so that we provide primarily skill-training rather than the
values we originally set out to teach.
One problem with teaching values is that usually clinicians do not get
students until the third year. Because clinical education still is not effec-
tively integrated into the entire curriculum, the values and way of thinking
about the law that we are trying to teach does not get communicated to
students until after their perceptions have been fixed and the traditionalists
have molded them. We need to integrate our approaches, resources and con-
cerns more into the first two years. The tremendous wealth of raw experi-
ence and data we have developed through our clients and cases needs to be
incorporated into the first and second year courses of civil procedure, con-
tracts, property, and criminal law to maximize our impact as well as to util-
ize us effectively.
We, as clinicians, find ourselves in somewhat of a depression as we see our
values and goals grudgingly tolerated by the students so that they can get
skills training. We need to begin reevaluating our own goals and renew our
commitment. Perhaps we need to adjust those goals. Perhaps the things we
think are important are not as important as we believe they are. I hope that
is not so. One of our most important objectives as clinicians is conveying the
values, meaning the total process of practicing of law, and not only the skills.
We need to reenergize ourselves as clinicians, so that we can get back on
track with some of those roles that we originally had.
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ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Recently, I was cleaning out an old file cabinet and found a clipping from
a Chicago paper. The headline said something like, "Northwestern Law
Clinic Students Handle Real Cases, Idea May Spread." There was a picture
of Gary Laser, who is now the clinic director at Chicago Kent Law School,
looking very much like a child. Looking back, the only profound thing I can'
say is what an exciting and wonderful thing it has been to be part of this
experimentation that has changed the face of legal education.
Lots of things have changed in the years since all of us started being
clinical teachers. We have changed. Our students have changed. The law
schools have changed and the world has changed profoundly. If we are
looking to the future, we should be looking for a way to adapt to the world
as it is, rather than into the world as we would like it to be.
For me, the concept of the clinical program as a laboratory, is a very
important one. What does the clinical program as a laboratory mean? It
means the clinic is a place to discover information about the practice of law,
information that has been missing from the law school curriculum. When I
graduated from law school in 1969, the faculty taught us about an idealized
world where there was some scientific way of looking at the law. We went
out into in the world and saw it was completely different from what they had
told us. There was tremendous dissonance between what we were lead to
believe would be there and what was there. Not only did we lack the skills
we needed, there was also quite a difference between the substantive law we
learned and the legal rules which were enforced. The law was what the trial
judge said it was. He had never read a Supreme Court case and did not
know what was going on in the Warren Court. It was all wrong.
This led some of us to go back to the law school to say, "Hey, this is
wrong. You are missing what is happening in the world." The Clinic as
laboratory, then, has sought to identify both from a skills perspective and
from a legal doctrine perspective how the curriculum has needed to change
to better equip students to deal with the world as it is.
Clinics teach people to have the combination of skills that are necessary to
practice law and the intellectual skills to be able to use the law to achieve
client objectives-to identify and achieve goals. Because the first clinical
teachers came from legal services practices, we shared the values that Dean
was talking about-law reform, to change the world. We had a law reform
objective for our clinics and maybe even something broader. We wanted to
reform the society. We saw a possibility of social change through the prac-
tice of law.
We early teachers were lucky because fifteen years ago students were part
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of the same social movement from which we had come. The students had a
generational conciousness that there were things wrong, that there were
ways to cure those things, and that we could work together to change the
world. The 1986 we dreamed of then differs widely from the one that has
come to be. We thought that perhaps Charles Reich would be Chief Justice
and not William Rehnquist.
When I began teaching in a clinic, the students I have today were eight
years old, the same age as my son. We do not share many common exper-
iences. I need to find a way to reach them that takes advantage of who they
are rather than who I am.
Kandis said: "We touch our students profoundly." What do we mean
when we say we touch them profoundly? It means to me that students are
individuals, not metaphors. We can teach them to identify their own values
and the relationship between those values and the decisions they have to
make as lawyers. At a fundamental level, their values are most often altruis-
tic. But career paths which permit the application of non-selfish ideals are
not apparent to them. We can help them see the choices regarding careers,
clients, cases, and ways of practicing law which are more nearly consistent
with their own core values as well as our own.
I think all the schools that Phil mentioned are important parts of the intel-
lectual history of clinical education. I disagree, however, with one central
aspect of saying we follow the medical school model. The poor people we
serve have a very different relationship to the education of law students than
the patients for medical students. The poor people who are medical patients
probably present all the illnesses that the medical profession will see in their
practice so that they do not have to treat their patients as metaphors. The
poor people we serve have a very different set of legal problems from the
people most of our students ultimately will serve. We need to look at ways
that those cases can be metaphors for the practice of law.
There is a part of the medical school model that has something important
to say to clinical legal education. We need to reach beyond our students, to
the practicing lawyers. We should do for the legal profession what medical
schools do for the medical profession, to lead them in better ways to prac-
tice. We should send out from our law clinics the "wisdom" we have accu-
mulated from our analysis of the lawyering process. The data we have
generated about the practice of law, from observing and thinking about the
smaller pieces of the process, can surely inform the practitioner in ways
which have completely escaped traditional scholarship.
Finally, I want to address the question of change in legal education. In
October's AALS newsletter, Susan Prager wrote about the need for diversity
[Vol. 36:337
Clinical Legal Education
in legal education. She said that the best law schools have room for the
traditional analysts, the clinicians, the critical legal studies people, the femi-
nists, the law and economics, and other "law and -s." When I graduated
from law school, there was room for none but the analysts.
Teaching about skills and values is not left only to the law clinic these
days. Skills teaching effectively can be spun off from our laboratory into
classroom settings, e.g., by simulation. This gives us a tremendous freedom
that we did not have before when we had to teach everything in the law
clinic. Now we can concentrate our energy to teach those things that are
most important. For me that is teaching good judgment, the ability to make
strategic decisions that most closely achieve goals, to separate the lawyer's
values from the client's values, to understand what the appropriate goals are
and to have methods for achieving them. That, to me, is the goal of clinical
education both in the past and in the future.
LEAH WORTHAM:
In listening to the speakers, I was reminded of the transcription of an
address by Anthony Amsterdam that appeared in the Journal of Legal Edu-
cation.2" Amsterdam said his topic let him skip all the struggles of the twen-
tieth century and go right into the twenty-first. In his vision of the twenty-
first century, the Clinic had become the law school. The resources for a
pervasive clinical method were found by doing more cheaply that which is
easy to do cheaply, not clinical education but teaching substantive law.
With substantive law courses taught by programmed materials, the re-
sources were freed for clinical teaching to provide the rest of the curriculum.
We will see if that is what happens.
Our order was not an accident. We started and ended on an optimistic
note and kept our more skeptical speakers in the middle. I am going to take
the Chair's prerogative to ask a question. Like good lawyers, the panel par-
ticipants may respond by answering the question they wanted to answer any-
way. Dean and Roger said that they see a problem and a challenge in the
loss of a normative mission, the loss of a value orientation. Phil offered a
skeptical note about whether or not that is what students want to buy.
Kandis and Elliott agree about the normative mission, but they were more
optimistic about its salability in the world of the 1980's, 1990's or 2000.
What do you mean by the normative mission? Is it an anachronism?
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Are students really different? Phil posed today's student concerned with a
job and wanting only the black letter law. Black letter law in the Clinic
20. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
612 (1984).
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would be translated into skills, i.e., teach me the ten commandments of cross
examination.
My memory of law school is exactly that. The students wanted, but had
to be pushed away from, a desire to memorize a set of things that would
make it a trade school.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
My problem may be that Charles Reich was my teacher, in fact, my most
inspiring teacher. The classes that inspired me in law school were the ones
where Professor Reich, who taught the criminal law, created intellectual
puzzles that had almost nothing to do with the rules. We spent the first four
weeks of criminal law on the lifeboat case, Regina v. Dudley & Stephens; 21
four weeks plumbing the philosophical depths of that one case.
In constitutional law, my most inspiring teacher was Charles Black. We
began by studying the effort to call a federal constitutional convention to
overrule the Supreme Court's rulings on apportionment. It was a current
controversy on the front pages of the newspaper. The issues were in some
sense beyond the depth of students in their first week of law school, but we
loved to struggle with them. The class really responded.
Clinicians offer intellectual stimulation that is often tangential to the ac-
tual cases that students are working on. For example, in a disability case in
my clinic, a student discovered that her client had cancer, and the client's
doctor had not told her. We discussed whether the student should tell her
client that she had cancer, whether the client might need psychiatric help
that also would help in getting disability benefits, and what the differences
were between the lawyer's and the doctor's role in the case. Many students
were willing to investigate these issues seriously.
But in recent years, more students are likely to want to know only what
they can do to move the case along. If we try to engage them in an ethical or
interdisciplinary conversation lasting several weeks, they may become quite
impatient. Many will decline our suggestions that they read articles that
bear on issues in their case unless those readings will help to resolve out-
standing problems. And articles critical of the social system in which they
are operating are likely to seem particularly irrelevant to the goals which
they sought to further through their clinical education. They tend to want
to get through an issue and go onto the next one.
ROGER WOLF:
The change I see does not so much concern whether students see law
21. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
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school as a trade school. It is that they are coming to law school as a secure
way of making lots of money rather than a way to change society.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Maybe they are right.
ROGER WOLF:
They may well be right. Maybe we have to take their values as they are
and say you are not wrong in trying to make lots of money, but let's do it
ethically.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
That is not what I mean about them being right. I do not know if money-
making is the issue. The question is whether law can now be an instrument
of social change, whether litigation can change institutions. Those kinds of
questions may be beyond the scope of our panel, but maybe the perception
that litigating is not a way to effect change is accurate. But perhaps we can
change some other aspect of lawyering that is, if not of equal value, or at
least of some value.
ROGER WOLF:
Like what?
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Protecting clients.
ROGER WOLF:
You mean doing a better deal?
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
No, protecting clients from lawyer's values. I suppose Tom Shaffer's old
example is still relevant. Could there be as many husband's who think ill of
their wives' intelligence as there are spend-thrift trusts?
We did a simulation in our clinic using a sex-offense case. We mixed the
Women in the Law Clinic with the Criminal Clinic students. There was a
lot of anger that we had chosen this sex offense case as an example, because
they thought it stereotyped women. The client in this simulation, however,
never claimed consent as a defense. He said he did not do it. The students
came up with consent as a defense. It had been imposed on the client from
the lawyer.
Isn't changing that kind of behavior an important value-lawyers over-
reaching their clients? This is just one example. We probably could go
around the table and take a look at others.
DEAN HILL RIVKIN:
I think that forces in the market places are too powerful to hope that we
shall have influence in reforming the private sector. That is, unless we mean
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writing a book like The Inner Game of Lawyering to teach people to do
things better and, in doing so, to be happy, content people. I find that prob-
lematic in itself given the dissatisfaction I see in people in large and even
medium-sized firms. It seems to me to discard the whole notion of strug-
gling to come up with ends for the process as opposed to an emphasis on
means.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
When was it different?
ROGER WOLF:
It was different in the beginning days. I want to take issue with your
suggestion about law reform. We should be doing more law reform in
clinical education. In our clinic at the University of Maryland, we have
taken on Montrose, a juvenile institution in the state. We are challenging
the treatment and care that inhabitants are getting there. It has been a won-
derful experience. The problem has pulled a lot of clinicians together work-
ing on the same case and through it we are teaching a total lawyering course.
First, we found the social ill that we wanted to change. We are attempting
change through litigation and legislation. We are engaged in negotiations
with the state. We have interviewed witnesses, taken depositions, developed
our theory of the case through innumerable strategy sessions and the stu-
dents have gotten a feel for what the lawyering process is all about.
This type of case that challenges one's values and skills-requires one not
only to have legal skills but to understand the process and social alternatives
as well. This is where clinical education comes out the strongest. Lately we
have tended to try and get cases that can be handled in three months of a
semester. We do not want to take the big case since students only get a little
slice of it, and I think we have made a mistake.
KANDIS SCOTT:
I have heard a lot of conflicting things. Someone hoped the clinics might
change the law schools into more than trade schools. Phil gave examples of
the wonderful esoteric and exciting intellectual adventures he had in law
school.
Elliott, on the other hand, expressed frustrations that many of us felt
when we left law school: "I don't know how to do anything. And I resent
my legal education, because law school put all these great ideas into what I
hope was a good brain and then sent me out unable to do anything." We
wanted to make law school into a trade school.
Now I fear that those of us who know how to ply the trade have become
coated with intellectual pretension. Much of law practice deals with human
problems, people struggling to cope with life as it changes, as Elliott said. I
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fear we have turned our backs on the richness of human existence that is the
raw meat of law practice.
Preparing students for practice is a wonderful, exciting challenge. Why
don't we get back to it and not be ashamed of it? I heard all of us, including
me, criticizing skills training. Skills training should be put in the context of
empowering smart law students so that they will then go out and help. I
understand they could hurt too, but I am not afraid of that, as others of you
might be.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
I do not think there is anything wrong with skills training. It just saddens
me that we may settle for skills training when we could be doing, and used to
do, much more. One of the main reasons why we are being pressed to settle
for so little is simply that most students are now spending at least twenty
hours a week at part-time jobs, in addition to going to law school. Ten years
ago, many students worked, but most did not have to do so. I am not blam-
ing the students for this. But it does mean they have less time left over for
reading books and following the tendrils of the law.
KANDIS SCOTT:
One last comment about skills training. Listening to the others has made
me rethink it. Is skills training less important now, or is it that we are no
longer challenged by that part of our job? I wonder what we would find if
we asked students how they value skills training and contrasted that to the
answers of experienced clinical teachers. Skills training is easier for us now
and maybe less exciting. I am not sure it is less important.
ROGER WOLF:
I am not sure that any of us deprecate skills training. The question is
whether you take a case because it teaches a skill, or whether you take the
case because of the value in the objectives of the case. Through handling the
law reform case you can teach the same skills.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
I do not have a problem with skills training. I do a lot of skills training,
but I am afraid the words are pejorative. I have rethought for myself what
skills training means. I used to think that if you taught open ended ques-
tions versus closed ended questions, talked about reflecting feelings, taught a
set of ten or twelve ways of looking at the interview, that you taught a skill.
But out of the context of a vision of the world, that skill is useless.
Somewhere, we need to take off the blinders, so that the students have a
way to see and interpret the world. They need a way to see and interpret
and use the non-rational factors that drive decisions in the real world, for
example the racism and sexism in the court system. Not only to see such
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forces and be angry about them, but also to use them to advantage. I want
to push skills training off the plate because it can be done easily. It can be
done in simulation courses. I want my client contact clinic where the stu-
dents are in the world to do something broader, more grand. It is so expen-
sive we should do something grand with it.
LEAH WORTHAM:
There is a problem in definition when talking about skills training. There
is the first level of skills training-cross-examination, interviewing, counsel-
ling, negotiation. I think these are the first things that come to people's
minds when they think about skills training.
There also is a second level of skills training-formulating hypothesis
about how to gather information, developing cases and strategies, blue-sky-
ing about different alternatives to achieve an end, including legislative, litiga-
tion, and other strategies. I agree with Elliott about the first type of skills
training. As a primary focus, simulations may be able to do it much more
cheaply. It may be more motivating to teach those things to a live client, but
I am not sure it is more effective.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
But there is at least a third level-integrating the knowledge that a stu-
dent is getting from a case with what other people, often but not only schol-
ars, have already done. Elliott mentioned sexism. There is literature on
sexism. You can integrate what you have learned from your case and the
way the judge or adversary is behaving with the literature on sexism. It is
harder and harder to get students to explore that third level; for example, by
reading a little political science or sociology and integrating it with what is
happening in their clinic cases.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Several years ago, Frank Bloch wrote an article that talked about an-
drogogy-that adult learners need to have some experience that motivates
them to know that something is important to learn.22 We take advantage of
that phenomenon in clinical education. I am not sure that the experience of
students in the real world teaches them that they need to go read the philos-
ophers or political scientists to be able to solve the problems that they have
to solve on a daily basis. I do not know what would motivate them to do
that. We once thought they read those things in undergraduate school. Per-
haps we are not confident of that anymore.
22. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321
(1982).
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PHILIP SCHRAG:
The Bellow & Moulton Lawyering Process casebook is a brilliant book in
bringing together relevant knowledge from many other disciplines-from ec-
onomics, psychology, management science, and literature, among others. It
is a very rich book, and it was designed to be used in clinics. The resistance
of students to reading that book has been extraordinary. Clinical teachers
all across the country tried to assign the book, but students will not take the
time to read it.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
The Critical Legal Studies teachers have been more successful in getting
students to read philosophical literature. I do not know what they have
done that is special. At American, the four or five faculty members who are
involved in one way or another in Critical Legal Studies teach substantive
courses like torts and contracts. They seem successful in getting students
interested in looking at the relationship of values, ideology, and the law.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
Not only reading, but reflective writing increasingly is resisted in clinics.
In my clinic, we used to have students write a seven page semester paper in
addition to their classroom exercises and what they were writing to further
their cases. The assignment simply called on them to write in depth about
some small decisional moment or interpersonal event in one of their cases.
They could write about a decision to file one kind of motion instead of an-
other, or about a five minute, or even a five second, portion of a client inter-
view. The point was to look at something closely and reflectively for seven
pages. This year, after mutinies in two successive semesters over this diver-
sion from case handling, we have had to abandon this writing assignment.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
And because they were required to do it only because you said so. There
was no demonstration of its usefulness in any way in their lives. I do not
know that that is an irrational decision on their part or one that is fair to be
angry about. With all the competing demands, telling a student something is
in their interest is not enough. Students are not going to take your word for
it. We need to create devices that interest them. We had a lot of success this
year with simulations that had nothing to do with law. I took some ideas
from Paul Bergman at U.C.L.A. We had students do an advocacy exercise
where they had to convince the audience that men and women should share
housework equally. Students worked in small teams. It was the best advo-
cacy I had ever seen.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
Did they do that during class?
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ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Yes.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
Within class hours, students will do exercises. They resist the additional
demands on their time. And given the other pressures on them, I agree with
you that they are not being irrational.
LEAH WORTHAM:
Let us now turn to the audience for questions.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
Ms. Scott talked about clinical education as a bridge to the future. I have
not been able to find a future in practice. Legal services jobs are very scarce.
Are your students having similar problems?
KANDIS SCOTT:
I was not using transition to the future in quite the same way you are, but
certainly my students have had as much problem as you describe. Jobs are
declining in the public service arena, and there is less turnover in existing
jobs. On the other hand, it seems to me that one should look at public ser-
vice a little more broadly. Most practitioners in small firms are handling
people's problems. Probably because they cannot collect all their bills, they
provide much service pro-bono. Such practice often makes as important a
contribution to the solution of human problems as work in the public sector.
That may be a small consolation to those frustrated in their search for
employment.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
Do you have any studies on the kind of jobs your Clinic's students take?
KANDIS SCOTT:
No. We are all looking forward to the Catholic University survey to get
some information on that.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
I wonder whether if it is correct that there are fewer public interest jobs.
In 1969, there were actually very few. People invented them. I am not sure
it is possible to invent them anymore.
I think that there is something different going on-the rise in the place-
ment movement. In the late sixties, schools at the level of American Univer-
sity and Catholic University did not have much of a placement operation.
The law firms were not so large and so institutionalized to use placement
offices. The way placement offices function put special kinds of pressure on
students to have jobs by December, January, and February. Few legal serv-
ices programs, public defender offices, and public interest places hire
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through placement offices or have jobs in February for next September. Peo-
ple feel like failures because they do not have jobs at a time when it is not
rational to believe that they could have public sector jobs.
DEAN HILL RIVKIN:
I think Elliott is right. How many times do you talk about your law
school and find yourself saying, "We have more and more people going to
Cravath or Arnold & Porter." Phil mentioned before that if we opened up a
Covington & Burling Clinic in the law school, it would be immediately over-
subscribed. There would be long lines of students waiting for this type of
experience. How many schools do you hear proudly saying that they have
half their class going to three or four lawyer firms in small towns?
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
How often do you say, "Wait. You don't have to have a job in December.
The best jobs do not come available until September or Christmas."
DEAN HILL RIVKIN:
Then people start competing for judicial clerkships three years in advance.
When they are in nursery school, they are applying for Supreme Court clerk-
ships. And if you don't go to the right nursery school, you'll never get to the
right clerkship.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Well, how do you feel about your students going to Cravath? You have
taught them all you know about being a lawyer, and they are going to ply
their craft on behalf of General Dynamics?
DEAN HILL RIVKIN:
When I have discussions with students about that, I put some stock in the
old adage that you become what you are. As much as one seems to suggest
that you will resist and you will be able to ward off all the pressures and
negative influences of a big institution, I think I leave people with a sense
that that is not necessarily going to happen.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
I have been working on the survey of Clinic alumni. We are asking why
people took the Clinic, and how their experience affected them. We want to
see if anyone went into a Clinic wanting to work at Arnold & Porter and
came out wanting to work at the Clean Water Litigation Fund. How much
do you think a clinic can affect people's future plans?
ROGER WOLF:
That is a good question. It is my sense that we do not get in our clinic the
people who want to go onto the Cravaths. I sense that big law firms tele-
graph that they do not need the experience we offer so applicants are wasting
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their time taking a clinic. I have the sense that that message is transmitted
by some other professors in the law school as well.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
We did a survey on that subject a few years ago. We surveyed all the
major firms and a few minor ones. The overwhelming results were that firms
did not care one way or the other what people took in law school. The few
people who cared preferred that people take clinics.
DEAN HILL RIVKIN:
I was at a session with a lawyer from a major D.C. firm, who, in the best
sort of noblesse oblige said, "We really consider it a neutral or maybe a
negative factor. The problems students deal with in clinical programs are not
rich and complex and interesting." It was a total disconnection to what a
clinic's practice looks like.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
Is that his fault for being ignorant, or is it our fault for not getting out the
message?
PHILIP SCHRAG:
It is possible that on some level the disconnect exists, not because clinic
cases are not rich, but because many law firm cases are not rich. When
students go to a large firm they sometimes read deposition transcripts for
several years. In a clinic, they are actually on the streets investigating some-
thing. They may be disappointed in the large firm.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
My question concerns scholarship as a means for clinicians to affect the
profession. Should scholarship be defined as an important part of the clini-
cian's job? If so, what kinds of scholarship should be expected? How should
work be disseminated? Is some kind of institutional change needed within
the law school for clinicians to do this scholarship?
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
The scholarship question is a complex one. One of the problems with
requiring clinicians, and in fact the whole faculty, to do scholarship is that it
comes at a cost. Time spent doing scholarship is time not spent doing some-
thing else.
Clinicians have been engaged in scholarship for the past fifteen years. The
development of clinical education as we now know it is the result of clinical
scholarship. The work has not always appeared in print, but it has appeared
in forms usable in the profession of clinical teaching in law schools. I think
clinical teachers have not gotten scholarly credit for the innovation and ex-
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perimentation that has gone on and been transmitted through clinical teach-
ers' conferences and networks.
In some law schools, scholarship is very narrowly defined to mean "two
analytical law review articles in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
or better" before tenure, with X number of footnotes.
Clinicians should do scholarship. The data that is available to us is not
available to anyone else in the legal profession. It is urgent that we produce
such information, but the young clinicians who are suddenly on a tenure
track must make hard decisions about how to spend their scholarly time.
Should they take the safe route and produce the kind of scholarship that the
rest of the faculty does, or should they take the gamble of producing the
kind of informal empirical scholarship that derives from their work as clini-
cians? I think that without the support and encouragement of the faculty,
they will take the safe route. Then clinicians will produce scholarship that is
distracting from, rather than a contribution to, the development of sound
clinical education and sound legal education.
KANDIS SCOTT:
I have feelings as well as thoughts about this. Elliott says we do scholar-
ship already. I go one step further and say that clinicians should be excused
from scholarship as that term is commonly understood. That type of schol-
arship is a diversion of clinicians' energies from what they can best offer to
the community of scholars. I see traditional scholarship by clinicians as a
waste of the law school's resources.
That is my heartfelt position, but I also can take a more moderate one.
First, one should ask why it is desirable that clinicians publish articles, to
use a crude term to talk about scholarship. It may be important to getting
and keeping a job-tenure or long term contracts. Why is this writing neces-
sary to getting and keeping a job? I assume the law school wants to be sure
clinical faculty members are smart. There are many other ways to discover
that.
A second reason may be to show perseverance and good work habits.
Writing an article is a boring, painful, horrible thing to do, made only
slightly easier by using word processors that put footnotes at the bottom of
the page. Generally the clinicians are known to be among the hardest work-
ing, most disciplined, persevering members of the law school faculty. They
need not publish to prove that.
Third, we want every member of the law school community to make a
contribution to legal knowledge so as to make the world a better place. This
makes us consider what clinicians can best add to our knowledge about legal
education, practice, and doctrine. I think the clinician's most valuable con-
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tribution is not in traditional scholarship but rather, as Elliott said, in the
form of innovative curricular changes, new teaching methodologies. It may
be that we ought to make clinicians the specialists in teaching because they
have a better crack at doing it well. Teaching large classes is very hard. It is
difficult to make big classes exciting learning experiences, but almost easy to
do that in one-on-one teaching or in small classes. The challenge should be
to find ways to take teaching techniques from the clinic to the large class.
Alternatively, we could increase the number of clinicians so more students
could learn in a clinical, small group setting, while letting other members of
the faculty be our writing and publication specialists. In other words, we
should divide the law school's responsibility to contribute to human
knowledge.
Finally, clinicians already do much writing in their work-briefs, memo-
randa and so on. The articles that I would want to read by clinicians are of
two types. One is interdisciplinary. I no longer believe that just because the
great granddaddy of Clarence Darrow said you should stand away from
your witness on direct examination, it is true. I would like to see clinicians
get together with sociologists, psychologists, even advertising executives to
examine the conventional wisdom which has arisen in fields like trial
practice.
Second, I would like to see clinicians writing about what lawyers do in
their offices. Morris Cohen, the librarian at Yale, recently wrote an article in
Syllabus about putting lawyer's papers in law libraries. It would be exciting
to find out how lawyers do what they do most of the time; that is, work in
their own offices with their colleagues and their clients.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
I have a different view on traditional scholarship than Kandis does. Of
course, even traditional scholarship includes the kind of empirical, social
science investigation that Kandis has described.
To be able to spend time writing is a great privilege, not a burden or a test.
I think most clinicians would like to write if given the opportunity to do so.
What could be better than to be paid a large amount of money to sit and
think and write about anything that interests you?
The problem is that clinicians are expected to do this while taking on a
student contact load four or five times greater than that of most other faculty
members. It seems to me that the solution to this is to work towards a
system of expectations where clinicians do not teach clinics all the time, but
rather where a semester of clinical teaching is regarded as the equivalent to
two or three semesters of other kinds of teaching. For clinicians to write,
they need semesters of released time in which they can think and write at
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leisure with only the normal number of students knocking on their doors,
away from the pressures of daily court-imposed deadlines.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
As a clinic student, I would like to see more influence on private practi-
cioners. I would think scholarship would be an integral part of that effort. I
think many are not aware the clinic is there.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
You really think that practitioners read articles? Another question is
whether many of the things we are trying to teach can be taught through
articles. I think clinicians should be involved in writing and participating in
the training of lawyers who are engaged in the practice of law. It should be
both.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
I remember when I first heard Dean, Kandis, and Elliott talk when I got
involved in clinical education seven years ago. I now contrast that to what I
hear today. This sounds like a wake.
You seem to be saying that what you talked about seven years ago is no
longer out there. You sound as if the feelings about a relationship to a liv-
ing, growing, exciting experience have died.
Perhaps it is that we have changed. We are no longer in our thirties. We
are now in our forties. We have families and mortgages. I love to blame
students too, and my students are as interested in making money as any.
But perhaps, really, it is we who have changed.
Maybe we have lost our energy to keep the effort to bring our visions
about. I hope it is not true. I intend to continue to be here and continue to
do the teaching. We now have simulations as a required part of the curricu-
lum for all the students at our school.
It did sound like a wake.
ELLIOTT MILSTEIN:
That may be a fair description of what happened today. It may be a fair
description of we forty-two year olds, but I do not think it is a fair descrip-
tion of where clinical education is. The clinical section conference this sum-
mer in Boulder was very exciting with lots of new faces. There is a lot of
excitement among the younger clinicians that perhaps you do not here from
us tired people.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
I do not think that students are to blame. The students are simply re-
sponding to the economy. If we ever again have a booming economy like
that of the late sixties-perhaps this time without war-things could turn
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around in clinical and legal education generally. Students' intellectual and
professional aspirations would broaden accordingly.
FOLLOW-UP FROM AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
I see students worried about the future. They worry if they will ever be
able to buy a house. Students come out of law school forty thousand dollars
in debt and worry about how they will pay those debts.
PHILIP SCHRAG:
That is a very reasonable concern.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:
I am a 1985 graduate of Catholic Law School and a Clinic alumni. I went
to work for one of those rich law firms for a year and now have found a job
with a public interest law firm.
I came to law school with the sole purpose of helping others. I heard that
from all my professors at Catholic Law School including all the clinicians. I
heard it from many other students who came to law school for that reason.
What bothers me is the arrogance of continually saying, "Go out and help
others" without an acknowledgment of how hard it is to find work doing
that. Even after a year at a fancy law firm, I found it difficult.
I think the challenge in 1986 is pointing people to ways to support oneself
in practicing law to help others. I never received any counselling on creative
ways to do that. I just heard the same old thing, "Go out and work for the
public defender." The public defender has not hired anyone in two years.
Maybe the answer is that one goes to work for a large law firm at $50,000
a year and pays off one's debts so it is possible to go on to something else.
LEAH WORTHAM:
We have returned to the subject of our first audience question-how stu-
dents who accept the normative goals that some of our panelists have said
clinical education should foster can find work achieving those goals. A for-
mer Dean of this law school, Clinton Bamberger, who is here today, wrote a
wonderful article with a perspective on that subject. 23 In it he says the he-
roes of the profession are those who practice law for people. They are the
lawyers in legal services, or on their own, or in small firms, who work with
the wrenching issues that are most important to people-their homes, their
children, their livelihoods. Dean Bamberger suggests that law schools may
influence students to believe that such work is not a challenge worthy of
bright law graduates and in doing so pushes them toward large law firms
where clients do not "cry or bleed."
23. Bamberger, "Of Lawyers, Law Firms, and Law Practice for People: Ideas for New
Lawyers," 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57 (1980).
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So we are left with meat for another panel on creative ways to use the law
for good and clinical education's role in supporting that end. But our time is
over, so we must hold that to the Twentieth Anniversary.

